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RECENT DECISIONS

aside as excessive only gives the power to determine the limits within
which a verdict is neither excessive or inadequate, limits which in the
case of personal injury might include a wide range of possible verdicts.
The power to control does not give the power to find a verdict. "Like
the executive veto, it arrests, but does not by its exercise give the power
to enact."37 Thus the court in the Powers case is, in effect, saying that
it cannot and will not set aside a verdict as excessive unless it is clearly
excessive, that is, it will not set aside a verdict because it is one dollar
too much, but that this power to set aside a verdict when clearly excessive gives the court the power to determine the exact amount of the
verdict. It is a very different thing to say that a verdict is clearly excessive than it is to say that the verdict shall be this particular amount.
It is very similar to the difference between saying that you will not pay
more than $100 for a particular article and saying that you will pay
$50 for it.
The court adopted the practice that it did in the Powers case for a
pragmatic reason, namely, that such a remittitur would expedite litigation and lessen the expense thereof. That this end would be accomplished can hardly be doubted. Nor can it be doubted that such an end
is a desirable one. It would seem unfortunate, however, that the court
would abandon a practice which has been in effect in this state for over
a half a century, on these grounds. It is to be desired that when the
question of additur is presented to the court it will follow the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Dimick v. Schiedt3s and refuse
to extend the rule any further. This would have the merit of bringing
Wisconsin into line with the Federal law on the question. However,
it would seem even more desirable if the court would reconsider its
position on the question of remittitur.
JOSEPH P. JORDAN
Federal Income Taxation-Deductions: Corporate Expenditures
Not Incurred in Carrying On a Trade or Business-Petitioner, a
closely-owned corporation, was engaged in the brewery supply business, and also owned rental property. It purchased certain lakeshore residential property and added extensive improvements so
that the property was usable as a summer residence and for entertainment. The officers and stockholders of the corporation, all closely
related, lived on the premises for about three months each summer,
paying $9,000 rent annually. The expenses deducted by petitioner
for the depreciation and maintenance of this property amounted to
approximately $35,000 a year. The Commissioner allowed the corporate taxpayer a deduction of only $9,000 each year, that is, to the
38 Supra note

37

28.

Supra note 24.
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extent of the aggregate rent received and included in the corporation's
income. The Tax Court held that the fair rental value of such premises for a three month summer period was not in excess of the
amounts paid, and that the petitioner could not deduct the maintenance expenses and depreciation in excess of the deductions allowed by the Commissioner.
The petitioner contended on appeal that where a corporation is
engaged in the business of holding realty for income, it cannot be
deprived of deductions for maintenance and depreciation on the sole
ground that the realty was occupied by its stockholders, where the
corporation collected a fair rental from them. Held: Inter alia,
that the claimed deductions were not incurred in the taxpayer's
trade or business within the meaning of the predecessor of Code
Section 162(a).' The property had little or no business use and
was held primarily for the personal use of the taxpayer's stockholders. International Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 275 F. 2d 578
(7th Cir. 1960).
Petitioner argued that there is no such thing as a non-business
activity of a corporation and that there is a "statutory assumption"
that transactions entered into by a corporation are in connection
with its business. Text writers support the general view of petitioner, and this "assumption," in effect, can be found as early as
3
19222 and as recent as 1960.
From a reading of the statute in its prior form and of other
statutes, it is easy to see how this belief arose. The Revenue Act of
1916 contained separate deduction sections for individuals and for
corporations. 4 Section 5 provided for the deduction of expenses by
individuals only when "carrying on a trade or business," thereby
requiring the individual to prove that he was carrying on a trade or
business. Section 12, however, provided that corporations were allowed deductions of expenses "in the maintenance and operation of
its business and properties." Congress, by electing to use a different
phraseology in Section 12 than was used in Section 5, suggested that
REVENUE CODE OF 1954 §162. Trade or Business Expenses. (a) In
General.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary

INTERNAL

expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business, ....

2 "... the first general section is devoted to the establishment of the distinction
between business and personal expenses and is consequently applicable to
individuals only." Montgomery, Inconze Tax Procedure, 851 (1922).
3 ". . . as respects a corporation, if it is active at all, it is presumed for the

purpose of section 162(a) to be engaged in trade or business." Surrey and
Warren, Federal Income Taxation, 268 (1960 Ed.).
4 39 Stat. 759 (1916) §5 (Individuals) (a) . .. The necessary expenses actually
paid in carrying on any business or trade, not including personal, living, or
family expenses; ...

§12 (Corporations)

(a) .

.

. All the ordinary and neces-

sary expenses paid within the year in the maintenance and operation of its
business and properties. ...
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there was an underlying assumption that a corporation is engaged
in a trade or business.
The Revenue Act of 1918 changed Section 12 to read the same as
Section 5 with regard to the phrase "trade or business." 5 Congress,
in floor discussion and in committee reports, gave no indication
that by the change, it intended to require corporations to have the
burden of proving the additional fact that they are engaged in a
trade or business.
Prior to 1941, it was assumed by individual taxpayers that substantially every activity regularly carried on for the production of
income would fall within the term "trade or business." 7 In 1941, the
court in Higgins v. Commissioner," held that the management of
taxpayer's security investments, no matter how extensive, did not
constitute a trade or business, thereby taxing the income derived
from his securities and disallowing the expenses in the management
of them. In 1942, the predecessor of Section 212 of the 1954 Code
was enacted.9 This new section gave to individual taxpayers the
right to deduct non-business expenses which were incurred in the
production or collection of income. According to the House Ways
and Means Committee report, the purpose of this section was to
correct the inequities that had arisen out of the inadequacy of the
predecessor of Section 162(a) and the court construction thereof in
the Higgins cam"
The legislature's limitation of Section 212 to individuals was
interpreted by some authorities as supporting the proposition that
'
"corporations are presumed to be engaged in a trade or business."11
But an equally justifiable interpretation would be that the legislature was only trying to remedy the inequities which had befallen
individuals as in the Higgins case by providing a statute to allow
for deduction of non-business expenses. Cases up to this time, involved with the question of being "engaged in a trade or business,"
were cases involving individuals and not corporations. 12 Corporate
expenses were not questioned as to whether they were incurred in
z 40 Stat. 1066 (1918) §214 (Individuals) and §234 (Corporations) both
read as follows: (a) . .. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business....
Note that the additional word "ordinary" was added to §214 (Individuals).
6 Seidman's Legislative History of Federal Income and Excess Profits Tax Law
1938-1861, 909.
7 Carson and Weiner, Ordinary and Necessary Expenses, 132 (1959).
8 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
9 56 Stat. 819, 26 U.S.C. §23(a) (2) (1942).
10 Seidman's Legislative History of Federal Income and Excess Profits Tax Law
1953-1939, 1315.
II Supra note 3, at 268.
121Monell v. Helvering, 70 F. 2d 631 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Kane v. Commissioner, 100
F. 2d 382 (2d Cir. 1938) ; Kales v. Commissioner, 101 F. 2d 35 (6th Cir. 1939).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

a trade or business, and consequently it seems the courts assumed
they were.
At the legislative hearing before the Senate Finance Committee
leading to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942, a recommendation was made to include corporations in the predecessor of
Section 212.13 The proponent's reason for this recommendation was
not because the presumption did not exist, but because of the tendency of some revenue agents to extend the principle of the Higgins
case, which involved individuals, to certain types of corporate expenditures. Committee statements failed to state the reason for not
including corporations in Section 212 even after this recommendation. Whether this was based on an assumption that all corporate
expenses were incurred in a trade or business and thus governed by
Section 162 is not known.
Additional support for the presumption seems easily derived
from the section of the code pertaining to deductible losses. 1 4 In
Section 165 a distinction is made between those losses allowed to
an individual and those to a corporation. Corporations are allowed
all their losses not compensated for by insurance, while in the case
of individuals, the statute specifically requires proof that the losses
were sustained in trade or business or in connection with a transaction entered into for profit. It is very plain that there is no statutory requirement in Section 165 on the part of the corporation to
show either of these facts which an individual must prove. Although,
the wording in Section 162 differs from that in Section 165, the petitioner in the principal case contended that the asumption is basic to
both.
It is the writer's opinion that the court's decision can be supported only if: (1) The court does not look at Section 165 as analogous to Section 162, and (2) the court interprets Section 162(a) and
its legislative history strictly, and applies the well-established rule
that "unless the claimed deductions come clearly within the scope
of the statute, they are not to be allowed.", 5 However, the court's
13 Revenue Act of 1942, Hearing Before the Committee on Finance United States

Senate, Vol. 2 at 1733.

The pertinent parts of the section read as follows:
§165, Losses.
(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise.
(c)Limitation on Losses of Individuals.-In the case of an individual,
the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit,
(3) ...though not connected with a trade or business;
25 New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934) ; Deputy v. duPont,
308 U.S. 488, 493 (1939) ; Bradley v. Commissioner, 184 F. 2d 860 (7th Cir.
(1950) ; Greenspon v. Commissioner, 299 F. 2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956).

14
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rejection of the contention that a corporation is "assumed" to be
engaged in a trade or business is in accord with other cases. In
American Properties v. Commissioner'" a corporation which owned
rental property was disallowed a deduction for expenses incurred
in operating racing boats. The activities of constructing, maintaining, and operating racing boats did not constitute the carrying on of
a trade or business. Other cases also support the decision by holding
that the expense was a personal expense of the corporation's principal stockholder.' 7 By so holding, the cases necessarily require an
interpretation that the expenses are non-business as well as not
"ordinary" and "necessary."
The disallowance of corporate deductions does not seem to be
limited only to circumstances where the expense is personal. In
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissionery- the nature of the expense was in no way personal. The corporate taxpayer made a contract with its subsidiary whereby the parent became entitled to all
the subsidiary's profits and agreed to reimburse the subsidiary for
any operating deficit. The court held that the payment made by the
parent company to cover the operating deficit of the subsidiary was
not deductible under Section 162 because it was not "the business
of the taxpayer" to pay the costs of the subsidiary. No discussion
was involved as to any assumption that it is incurred in a trade or
business.
Under the law as it now stands the court in the principal case appears correct in rejecting any contention of a conclusive assumption.
Mertens, Law of FederalIncome Taxation, states:
A corporation is normally deemed to be engaged in a
"trade or business;" however, to the extent that it is operated solely for the pleasure or recreation of its stockholders
it is not engaged in a "trade or business."' 9
The principal case also held that because the property was held
primarily for the personal benefit of the stockholders, it follows that
the claimed expenses were not ordinary and necessary expenses.
If the expenses are disallowed on this basis, it would seem there
would be no practical need for the finding that they were not incurred in a trade or business. The corporation already had the burden of proving the expense was not personal under the requirement
that it must be "ordinary and necessary." "Ordinary and necessary"
expenses within the meaning of Section 162 are all the ordinary and
T.C. 1100 (1957), aff'd. 262 F. 2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958).
Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 279 (1948);
Bardahl Mfg. C.orp., 58, 147 P-H Memo T.C. (1958).
18 130 F. 2d 136, aff'd. 319 U.S. 590 (1943).
194 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation §25.08 (Zimet & Diamond Rev.
1628

'17Lanteen

1954).
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necessary expenses directly connected with or proximately resulting from carrying on any trade or business. 20 Therefore "ordinary
and necessary" requires the element of proximity to business which
is lacking where the expense deduction is primarily for the personal benefit of the stockholders.
All of the cases cited above 2" with the exception of Interstate
Transit Lines v. Commissioner= involved expenses characterized as
personal. However, it seems conceivable that in a situation similar
to the Higgins case 23 the requirement of incurred expenses in a
trade or business would result in the disallowance of other expenses
which would not be disallowed under the requirements of "ordinary
and necessary." The effect then would be to give the Commissioner
an added weapon for the disallowance of corporate expense deductions. If the claimed deductions are for depreciation of property held
for the production of income, they would be deductible under Section
167(a) (2).24 But, as to any other expense for the production of income not constituting a trade or business, it seems the same problem now exists as to corporations that existed as to individuals
prior to the original enactment of section 212.
Paul Pakalski

20

Lanteen Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 279 (1948);
Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F. 2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Northern
Trust Co. v. Campbell, 211 F. 2d 251 (7th Cir. 1954).

21Supra note 17.
22

23
24

Supra note 18.
Supra note 8. See also MlcCoach v. M\1inehill and Schuylkill Railroad Co., 228
U.S. 295 (1913).
§167. Depreciation.
(a) General Rule-There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
(1) of property used in a trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.

